Istituto Lombardo - Accademia di Scienze e Lettere - Incontri di Studio

SALUTO DEL PRESIDENTE DELL’ISTITUTO LOMBARDO

2019-04-25T12:12:09+02:00

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INTRODUZIONE

2019-04-25T12:12:08+02:00

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TEORIA FISICA E SUA REALIFICAZIONE. CASO DI STUDIO: LA CAUSALITÀ

2019-04-25T12:12:07+02:00

I will discuss realism of classical and quantum theories, assessing the untenability of the object ontology, and proposing its substitution with the notion of system used in operational theories, notion that represents a theoretical connection between two events. Within operational theories the distinction between theory and objective reality is well defined: the theory provides the mathematical description of systems and events, and predicts the joint probability of the events; objective reality is identified with the collection of events that actually occurred. I then analyse some cases of realification of the theory – namely the fallacy of identifying theory with reality. In particular, the cases of the notion of causality and causal connection between events are analysed, emphasising their purely theoretical nature, contrarily to the widespread connotation of objectivity. I re-establish the role of causality in physics as a theorem of quantum theory, and hence also of classical theory (which is a restriction of quantum theory), showing how it represents a probabilistic generalisation of the same concept used in special relativity, and discussing why such notion may trivialise in the classical case. I end with a critique of David Albert’s Past Hypothesis about the nature of time, and of the resulting Block Universe vision of space-time, to reaffirm Reality of Time.

INDETERMINATEZZA METAFISICA E MECCANICA QUANTISTICA

2019-04-25T12:12:05+02:00

The paper argues that quantum mechanics provide examples of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy that cannot be accounted for in purely modal terms. The best account of quantum indeterminacy has it that quantum systems have determinable properties without thereby having a unique determinate of that determinable.

COSTRUTTIVISMO E REALISMO NELLE SCIENZE FISICHE

2019-04-25T12:12:03+02:00

While classical physics is consistent with an objectivist point of view, the advent of modern physics undermines its fundamental assumptions. Quantum mechanics, in particular, put a question to the philosophy of science as to whether its intrinsically probabilistic interpretation should be revised in order to save the traditional epistemology, or should be adopted unconditionally, along with its revolutionary consequences. We propose some crucial arguments in favour of the second option. Finally, we discuss how the above choice may suggest a constructivist view about the nature of physical sciences.

QUALE LOGICA (PER LA FISICA)?

2019-04-25T12:12:03+02:00

The preeminent motivation to the scientific practice – stated in a weak way – can be recognized in the individuation of recurring phenomena (or else empirical regularity), along with the manipulation, both experimental and theoretical, of these. One can thus pose the issue of the necessity of adopting a set of rules for the logical inferential process, in order to assign a syntax, a semantic content, and possibly an interpretation, to the empirical evidences. According to Aristotle, non-contradiction is “the firmest principle of all”: irrefutable, otherwise the very possibility of formulating thoughts fails. Throughout the present report, the entailments of refusing some of the laws of classical logic – e.g. non-contradiction – are exposed. Such a possibility sheds light on a plurality of logical systems: some traits of these, which are significant for Mathematics and Physics, are examined. For instance, the relevance of dialetheism and intuitionism will be discussed. Besides, the report discusses on which basis one should choose the logical system to be adopted for the scientific activity. The peculiar case study given by Quantum Theory serves as fil rouge in developing the reported matters.

SCIENZA E MATEMATICA: IL CASO DELL’INDISPENSABILITÀ

2019-04-25T12:12:02+02:00

In this brief contribution, I will introduce one of the most famous consequences of the interaction between science and mathematics, Putnam and Quine’s argument for the indispensability of mathematical entities. We will start by looking at its standard formulation, and how it is particularly cogent for scientific realists. After this, we will look at the main components of the argument, that is indispensability, naturalism and confirmational holism. Furthermore, we will see how naturalism and confirmational holism give rise to the specific type of scientific realism that underlies Putnam and Quine’s argument. Finally, we will look at some objections and unresolved issues connected to the argument.

REALISMO E INDETERMINATEZZA NEI FONDAMENTI DELLA MATEMATICA

2019-04-25T12:12:01+02:00

Two of the most influential foundational approaches in the philosophy of mathematics of the past thirty years, i.e. neologicism and ante rem mathematical structuralism, suffer from metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy. My present aim is to offer an explanation of this phenomenon and provide a solution in terms of arbitrary reference.

ADAPTIVE EMPIRICISM

2019-04-25T12:12:00+02:00

This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call ‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as to how to develop this position more fully.

IPOTESI E SOTTODETERMINAZIONE IN FISICA E METAFISICA

2019-04-25T12:11:58+02:00

In the present paper, I aim to point out the shortcomings of those rather popular ‘radical’ naturalistic approaches to philosophy (especially metaphysics) according to which the latter can either be made dependent on, or altogether eliminated in favour of, science (especially physics). Based on a case study concerning the ontology of quantum entities, I will argue that – since metaphysical and scientific hypotheses are equally underdetermined by the empirical data – a moderate naturalistic approach is preferable, whereby metaphysics and physics are to be intended as complementary activities.

ALCUNE NOTE SULLA NOZIONE DI SPIEGAZIONE NELLE SCIENZE E IN FILOSOFIA

2019-04-25T12:11:59+02:00

When we explain something we use hypotheses, that is representations, which we formulate on the basis of some background theory or other. What makes such representations explanations are facts in the world. If, for instance, I can appeal to the hypothesis that the second referee has been unfair as a way of accounting for why Claudio is upset. and such a hypothesis is a (good) explanation if and only if the second referee has been unfair. It follows that even if scientific theories can always be read in an instrumentalist sense, in using them to formulate explanatory hypotheses we often appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to readings of them that go beyond their empirical content.

SCIENZA PER CONVENZIONE?

2019-04-25T12:11:59+02:00

Scientific Conventionalism claims that conventional traits stands in theories in many forms and for many reasons. Relevant arguments about conventionalities in science will briefly be discussed, pointing out a Linguistic Conventionalism and a Methodological Conventionalism. We will show the common ground between the two and how they interact. Eventually we will highlight how conventionality of theoretical framework implies conventionality of the mathematics and the ontology adopted.

PROPRIETÀ E LEGGI DI NATURA

2019-04-25T12:12:09+02:00

The notion of law of nature has been a major focus on the recent philosophical debate on science. In the attempt of determining what is the modal status of laws, whether they are necessary (as for necessitarianism) or contingent (as for contingentism), the recent debate has largely focused on the relationship between laws and natural properties. This contribution aims at defending a particular view on property individuation known as structuralism. According to structuralism, roughly, properties are individuated by their nomological/causal roles, and so by their relationships with the other properties and with the laws. In specific, I will defend a version of structuralism as a counterpart theory of property. Structuralism implies necessitarianism on laws of nature, and so this paper can be seen as a defense of this view as well.