GOVERNO DELL’ECONOMIA E TEORIA DELLA POLITICA ECONOMICA

Governance of the economy and theory of economic policy. This essay explores the views on economic policy of two of the most important thinkers of the Lombard enlightenment (Beccaria and Verri). The focus of the essay is on their theoretical contributions, so that the influence of Beccaria’s and Verri’s proposals on the actual course of Lombard economic reforms will not be discussed. In Beccaria and Verri, the theory of political economy is based on a rich view of societal interdependencies and the way they operate. Beccaria and Verri developed their views within the larger context of the European economic enlightenment. Their contributions partly reflect the theories of French, English and Scottish writers. However, they were able to build on other writers’ contribution in an independent and original way, often making important and influential contributions to the social theory of the European enlightenment (a standard instance is the influence Beccaria had on the development of criminal law and the formation of the utilitarian tradition). Beccaria and Verri were convinced that reforms were possible and that the force of reason could promote solutions suitable for the improvement of society. This was not an easy task, but mainly in the first period of their intellectual activities they were hopeful to achieve important results. They were convinced that economic policy should be able to free the natural capacities of individuals so that the whole society’s potential could be used to improve economic welfare. This belief comes from a very complex view of the behaviour and interaction among human beings. Society (but by no means all social conventions and institutions) was conceived as the outcome of a deliberate covenant. People agree to live together because otherwise they would live in constant insecurity for their lives and property, and because only under that covenant they would be able to enjoy a minimum degree of individual liberty. To secure this liberty the state must respect the division of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. This model obviously derives from Montesquieu and Locke, but Beccaria and Verri develop it in an original way especially with regard the judicial power. For they believe that to give judges the power to interpret the law is to give them normative power, which would not be admissible in a system of division of powers. Therefore they believed that, in order to avoid this breach of the model, laws and statutes should be very simple and clear. In this case only, that is, only when the normative framework is certain, individuals can act in an environment of security and full liberty. From this the need derives not only to have a simple legislation but also a somewhat limited role of the state in managing the economy, without resorting to an extensive regulatory system. Beccaria is the one who chiefly develops this part of the model. His ideas on the judiciary exerted an important influence in the following years, starting with the French Convention (1791), in which his contributions were extensively discussed. Beccaria’s views continued to attract the attention of prominent constitutional scholars (such as Laband) in the following decades and exerted a considerable influence on the drafting of a number of constitutional charts during the nineteenth century.