SCIENZA E MATEMATICA: IL CASO DELL’INDISPENSABILITÀ
https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.463
Published: marzo 4, 2019
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All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
In this brief contribution, I will introduce one of the most famous consequences of the interaction between science and mathematics, Putnam and Quine’s argument for the indispensability of mathematical entities. We will start by looking at its standard formulation, and how it is particularly cogent for scientific realists. After this, we will look at the main components of the argument, that is indispensability, naturalism and confirmational holism. Furthermore, we will see how naturalism and confirmational holism give rise to the specific type of scientific realism that underlies Putnam and Quine’s argument. Finally, we will look at some objections and unresolved issues connected to the argument.
Cinti, E. (2019). SCIENZA E MATEMATICA: IL CASO DELL’INDISPENSABILITÀ. Istituto Lombardo - Accademia Di Scienze E Lettere • Incontri Di Studio. https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.463
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