ADAPTIVE EMPIRICISM
https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.465
Published: marzo 4, 2019
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All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call ‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as to how to develop this position more fully.
Bacciagaluppi, G. (2019). ADAPTIVE EMPIRICISM. Istituto Lombardo - Accademia Di Scienze E Lettere • Incontri Di Studio. https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.465
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