IPOTESI E SOTTODETERMINAZIONE IN FISICA E METAFISICA
https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.466
Published: marzo 4, 2019
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All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
In the present paper, I aim to point out the shortcomings of those rather popular ‘radical’ naturalistic approaches to philosophy (especially metaphysics) according to which the latter can either be made dependent on, or altogether eliminated in favour of, science (especially physics). Based on a case study concerning the ontology of quantum entities, I will argue that – since metaphysical and scientific hypotheses are equally underdetermined by the empirical data – a moderate naturalistic approach is preferable, whereby metaphysics and physics are to be intended as complementary activities.
Morganti, M. (2019). IPOTESI E SOTTODETERMINAZIONE IN FISICA E METAFISICA. Istituto Lombardo - Accademia Di Scienze E Lettere • Incontri Di Studio. https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.466
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